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Abstract
This paper examines the Gricean view that quality maxims take prior-
ity over other conversational maxims. It is shown that Gricean conversa-
tional implicatures are routinely inferred from uĴerances that are recognized
to be untruthful. It is argued that this observation falsiﬁes Grice’s original
claim that hearers assume that speakers are obeying other maxims only if the
speaker is assumed to be obeying quality maxims, and furthermore the re-
lated claim that hearers assume that speakers are being cooperative only to
the extent that they assume they are being truthful.
1 Introduction
It is a platitude that conversation involves cooperation. Slightly more speciﬁcally,
philosophers and linguists typically take for granted that the ways we communi-
cate with each other in conversation rely on speakers and hearers cooperating on
eﬃciently geĴing information across, or something to the same eﬀect. By far, the
most inﬂuential account of communicative cooperation is also the one that can be
said to be responsible for establishing the paradigm of understanding conversa-
tions as cooperative enterprises in the ﬁrst place, namely the account given by Paul
Grice (1989).
Grice set out an understanding of conversation as guided by his Cooperative
Principle and conversational maxims, the laĴer being principles the observation of
*I am grateful to MaĴ Benton, Chris Gauker, Torﬁnn Huvenes, Eliot Michaelson, Anders
Schoubye, and Jonas Åkerman for valuable comments and suggestions.
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which ensure, or at least tend to ensure, cooperation in conversation. Grice also
held that cooperation in conversation is closely tied to truthfulness. In particular,
Grice thought that, among the maxims of conversation, certain maxims of quality
– admonishing speakers to be truthful – have a special status. Brieﬂy put, Grice
claimed that speakers are assumed to be observing other maxims only if they are
assumed to be obeying quality maxims.
I want to argue here that this view of cooperation does not square with the
facts about conversational practices. In particular, I want to target the claim that,
when hearers make the kind of inferences from what speakers say that Grice was
interested in, they assume that speakers are being cooperative only to the extent
that they assume they are being truthful. My main motivation for rejecting this
idea is the observation that inferences that have the marks of inferences of Gricean
conversational implicatures are often made by hearers, even when they recognize
that the speaker is violating quality maxims, and as such is being untruthful. Here
is an example where this happens:
Louise knows that Thelma has been drinking, but Thelma doesn’t re-
alize that Louise knows this.
(1) Louise. Are you OK to drive?
Thelma. I haven’t been drinking.
As I will argue, even though Louise knows that Thelma is being untruthful, she
nevertheless infers that Thelma meant to convey that she is OK to drive.
My focus is chieﬂy on the kind of inferences hearers draw based on observa-
tion of what speakers say, and less on what speakers intend, or can reasonably
intend, to be conveyed by their uĴerances. It has been pointed out – e.g., by Jen-
nifer Saul (2002) – that these twomay come apart. A speaker might want to convey
a particular implicature, even if the hearer fails to infer it, and a hearer might in-
fer unintended implicatures from what a speaker says. I conﬁne myself to cases
in which what the speaker intends to convey coincides with what the hearer infers
from what she says. My argument will be that hearers often make inferences in-
tended by speakers, based on assumptions of cooperation along Gricean lines, but
which do not involve assumptions of truthfulness.
Section 2 reviews Grice’s view concerning the priority of quality maxims and
the kind of example I take to be evidence against it. In section 3 I consider a num-
ber of ways the Gricean might respond to this evidence. I argue that there are
inferences hearers make that are best explained as proceeding via the assump-
tion that the speaker is cooperating, but which do not involve assumptions about
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the speaker’s truthfulness. Section 4 argues that the relevant inferences have the
features of inferences of Gricean conversational implicatures and brieﬂy discusses
some consequences for how to understand the kind of cooperation involved in con-
versation.
2 Grice on the Priority of Quality
2.1 The Gricean Category of Quality
Grice’s Cooperative Principle was stated as follows (Grice, 1989, 26):
Cooperative Principle
Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in
which you are engaged.
In turn, the maxims were divided into four categories, Quantity, Quality, Relation,
and Manner. Among these the category of Quality included a supermaxim and
two speciﬁc maxims (Grice, 1989, 27):
Supermaxim of Quality: Try to make your contribution one that
is true.
First Maxim of Quality: Do not say what you believe to be
false.
Second Maxim of Quality: Do not say that for which you
lack adequate evidence.
Here we will only be concerned with the Supermaxim of Quality and the First
Maxim of Quality.
Grice held that the First Maxim of Quality and the Supermaxim of Quality en-
joy a special status in relation to the other maxims and the Cooperative Principle.
In “Logic andConversation,” immediately after presenting themaxims, Grice com-
ments,
[I]t might be felt that the importance of at least the ﬁrst maxim of Quality is
such that it should not be included in a scheme of the kind I am constructing;
other maxims come into operation only on the assumption that this maxim
of Quality is satisﬁed. While this may be correct, so far as the generation of
implicatures is concerned it seems to play a role not totally diﬀerent from the
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other maxims, and it will be convenient, for the present at least, to treat it as
a member of the list of maxims. (Grice, 1989, 27)
Amajor task for this paper will be to examine how to understand the central claim
encapsulated in this passage, that is, the suggestion that “other maxims come into
operation only on the assumption that [the First Maxim of Quality] is satisﬁed.”
But it appears at ﬁrst sight that Grice thinks that the kind of communication that is
to be seen as guided by the maxims, in some sense, relies on the assumption that
the speaker is not saying something she believes to be false.
This idea is reinforced in the “Retrospective Epilogue,” where Grice wrote,
The maxim of Quality, enjoining the provision of contributions which are
genuine rather than spurious (truthful rather than mendacious), does not
seem to be just one among a number of recipes for producing contributions;
it seems rather to spell out the diﬀerence between something’s being and
(strictly speaking) failing to be, any kind of contribution at all. (Grice, 1989,
371)
By “The maxim of Quality,” in this passage, Grice presumably has in mind the Su-
permaxim of Quality. This is suggested by his characterizaton of it as pertaining to
“contributions,” rather than to what is said more speciﬁcally. Similarly, the Coop-
erative Principle is explicitly a principle about contributions. For Grice, contribu-
tions comprised both things that are said, or asserted, and things that are conversa-
tionally implied. One way of understanding this passage from the “Retrospective
Epilogue,” therefore, is to see it as suggesting that unless one is aiming to make a
truthful contribution, one cannot be seen to be cooperating in the sense intended
by the Cooperative Principle. I will return to this idea concerning cooperation later
(see section 3.2). First, I want to look at the former passage, concerning the relation
between the First Maxim of Quality and the other maxims.
2.2 Violating and Flouting Quality Maxims
A ﬁrst stab at how to understand Grice’s suggestion in the passage from “Logic
and Conversation” quoted above might be as follows (where H is the hearer and
S is the speaker):
(I) H assumes thatS is trying to satisfy othermaxims in producing an uĴerance
u only ifH assumes that S satisﬁes the First Maxim of Quality in producing
u.
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This is one way of reading Grice’s suggestion that “other maxims come into oper-
ation only on the assumption that [the First Maxim of Quality] is satisﬁed.” (1989,
27)
The immediate problemwith (I) is that it is arguably in conﬂictwith theGricean
understanding of a range of cases in which the First Maxim of Quality is exploited
in order to generate conversational implicatures. These include tropes like irony,
metaphor,meiosis, andhyperbole (seeGrice, 1989, 34–35). TakeGrice’swell-known
example of the ﬁrst of these:
X, with whom A has been on close terms until now, has betrayed a secret of
A’s to a business rival. A and his audience both know this. A says X is a ﬁne
friend. (Grice, 1989, 34)
In this case the hearer sees that the speaker is not satisfying the First Maxim of
Quality. So according to (I), she should not assume that the speaker is trying to
satisfy any other maxims in making the uĴerance. But if so, on the Gricean picture,
the hearer should not infer that the speaker wants to convey something diﬀerent
from what she said.1 In particular, the Gricean treatment of these cases assumes
that the hearer takes the speaker as trying to satisfy the Supermaxim of Quality.
WhenA says that X is a ﬁne friend, the hearer should think that the speakerwants to
satisfy the Supermaxim of Quality, and in this way infer that shewants to implicate
that A is not a ﬁne friend.
The obvious response to this is that, according to Grice’s conception of irony,
metaphor, meiosis, and hyperbole, these are all cases in which the First Maxim
of Quality is ﬂouted. For Grice, cases that give rise to inferences of implicatures
are cases in which the speaker violates maxims in a way that is intended to be
noticed by the speaker and thereby to trigger the kind of reasoning that is expected
to terminate in the inference of an implicature.
More generally, since irony and the other tropes involve ﬂagrantly saying some-
thing one believes to be false, this is presumably not the kind of untruthfulness
that a Gricean would take to be a hindrance to cooperative communication. And
in particular, if the Gricean is right that hearers’ inferences of implicatures turn
on assumptions of truthfulness, it is reasonable to think that such assumptions are
1Grice held that, in cases like irony, the speaker has not said, but “has made as if to say,” (Grice,
1989, 34) the literal content of her uĴerance. The reason for this is that Grice thought of what is said
as akin to how some think of assertion. In this paper I use the notion of saying in a loose sense, since
nothing will hang on this. So, for instance, I allow myself to assume that ironic speakers say the
literal contents of their uĴerance, even if they do not assert it. For discussion of this, see, e.g., Neale
(1992), Stokke (2013).
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not defeated by a speaker’s use of tropes such as irony, metaphor, meiosis, and
hyperbole.
So, since in these kinds of cases the violation of the First Maxim of Quality is
done in such a way as to make the hearer notice the violation, the claim that the
First Maxim of Quality is a prerequisite for the operation of the other maxims is
beĴer understood as not pertaining to cases in which it is ﬂouted for the purpose
of generating implicatures.
Let us stipulate that by disregarding a maxim, we mean violating it but not by
ﬂouting it. To disregard a maxim is to disobey it, but not in the way that is in-
tended to call aĴention to itself, which Grice identiﬁed as exploiting maxims in
order to generate implicatures. Given this, one proposal for understanding the
Gricean claim concerning the priority of quality maxims is as in (II).2
(II) H assumes thatS is trying to satisfy othermaxims in producing an uĴerance
u only ifH assumes that S is not disregarding the First Maxim of Quality in
producing u.
According to (II), assuming that someone is trying to satisfy maxims requires as-
suming that they are speaking truthfully, while allowing that someone may bla-
tantly and openly speak untruthfully in order to generate implicatures by exploit-
ing quality maxims.
2.3 Implicatures Inferred from Detected Quality Violations
A situation in which a hearer can see that a speaker is ﬂouting a maxim is not
the only kind of situation in which a hearer can see that a speaker is violating a
maxim. The hearer might be able to see that the speaker is violating a maxim but
is not doing so in the kind of blatant way that is intended to trigger inferences of
implicatures. If a hearer can see that a speaker is violating a maxim and that the
speaker thinks that the hearer will not notice, the speaker is not ﬂouting themaxim.
Consequently, (II) implies that if the hearer can see that the speaker thinks that
her violation of the First Maxim of Quality will go unnoticed, the hearer will not
try to reconcile that she said what she did with an assumption that she is observing
maxims other than the First Maxim of Quality.
However, at least at ﬁrst sight, this does not square with the facts about how
uĴerances are interpreted in this kind of situation. Even if the hearer can see that
2See Benton (in press) for a suggestion of this kind.
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the speaker is being covertly untruthful, she may still take the speaker as having
implicated something other thanwhat she said. Consider our example from above:
Louise knows that Thelma has been drinking, but Thelma doesn’t re-
alize that Louise knows this.
(1) Louise. Are you OK to drive?
Thelma. I haven’t been drinking.
In this case Louise will take Thelma as having implicated that she is OK to drive.
Yet Louise knows that Thelma is violating the First Maxim of Quality, even though
she is not doing so by ﬂouting themaxim.3 So, since the implicature is still inferred,
this is evidence against (II).
In support of this conclusion, we can note that the Gricean will agree with this
description of the analogous, truthful cases, as in (2).
Thelma hasn’t been drinking.
(2) Louise. Are you OK to drive?
Thelma. I haven’t been drinking.
The Gricean will explain (2) as a case of conversational implicature, more precisely
a case of implicature inferred via the assumption that Thelma is trying to satisfy
the Maxim of Relation (Grice, 1989, 27).
Maxim of Relation
Be relevant.
Note that, in both (1) and (2), the inference the hearer makes is also intended by
the speaker. In the terminology of Saul (2002), both are case in which an “uĴerer-
implicature” coincides with an “audience-implicature.” By the same token, even if
writers like Stephen Neale (1992) are right that being intended by the speaker is a
necessary condition on conversational implicature, both cases qualify. (I return to
this in section 4.1).
3If one prefers, one may reconstruct the case so as to specify that Louise does not know prior to
Thelma’s uĴerance that she has been drinking and hence already knows the answer to the question
she is asking. For example, one can think of cases in which Louise recognizes from Thelma’s ut-
terance itself that she has been drinking, e.g., she is slurring her words, or the like. Thanks to Eliot
Michaelson for this suggestion.
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Given that the Gricean will count (2) as a case of conversational implicature, to
vindicate the claim in (II), the Gricean needs to motivate that there is a relevant dif-
ference between (1) and (2). In particular, the Gricean needs to argue that, despite
the apparent similarities mentioned above, (1) should not be classiﬁed as a case of
conversational implicature, or more generally as the kind of inference that Grice
was interested in accounting for. In the next section, I will argue that there is no
convincing way of making this kind of argument.
3 Inference, Cooperation, and Truthfulness
3.1 Repairing Maxim Violations
One potential way of arguing for a diﬀerence between (1) and (2) starts from the
observation that the hallmark of a Gricean inference is that it aims at establishing
that maxims that are violated at the level of what is said are satisﬁed at the level
of what is meant or implied. As we might say, when maxims are violated at the
level of what is said, a Gricean inference should repair such violations at the level
of what is implied.
In (1) Louise recognizes that Thelma is violating the First Maxim of Quality at
the level of what is said. Hence, it might be objected that Louise’s inference should
aim at repairing this violation at the level of what is implied. In particular, Louise’s
inference should establish that Thelma is satisfying the Supermaxim of Quality.4
However, in (1), Louise’s inference does not establish that Thelma is satisfying the
Supermaxim of Quality, since she can see that what is implied is something Thelma
believes to be false (that she is OK to drive). So the violation of the First Maxim of
Quality is not repaired. Hence, so the objection goes, the inference involved in (1)
is not of the kind the Gricean wants to associate with conversational implicatures.
In reply to this objection we should note that, while inferring implicatures is in-
deed a process that centrally aims at repairingmaxim violations, this kind of repair
strategy is directed at ﬂoutings of maxims. An implicature is inferred, according
to the Gricean scheme, when the hearer can see that the speaker is blatantly and
4The quality maxims have the feature that while the First Maxim of Quality and the Second
Maxim of Quality pertain to what is said, the Supermaxim of Quality is explicitly a principle con-
cerning contributions. Since Grice took contributions to include both what is said and what is im-
plied, the Supermaxim of Quality plays the role of the maxim that is seen to be satisﬁed at the level
ofwhat is implied by implicatures such as those involved in irony, metaphor, etc. For othermaxims,
e.g., the Maxim of Relation, the repair will target the maxim itself.
8
noticeably failing to comply with one or more maxims, and hence that she is do-
ing so precisely with the intention of triggering the inference of the implicature.
Yet, in (1), the First Maxim of Quality is not ﬂouted but is violated in a covert way,
albeit the deceit is unsuccessful. In the terminology introduced above, Thelma’s
uĴerance in (1) disregards the First Maxim of Quality. So, since the First Maxim of
Quality is not ﬂouted, in this case, why should the hearer try to repair the violation
at the level of what is implied, that is, why should she assume that the speaker is
trying to satisfy the Supermaxim of Quality?
Moreover, Thelma does ﬂout a maxim at the level of what is said, namely Rela-
tion, and this violation is repaired by the inference of the implicature that Thelma
is OK to drive. Inferring the implicature that Thelma is OK to drive is a way of
squaring what she said, i.e., that she has not been drinking, with the presumption
that she is trying to obey Relation. In this case, the measure of what is relevant
is naturally taken to be given by what constitutes an answer to the question that
was explicitly asked, i.e., “Are you OK to drive?” Since there are only two answers
to this question – yes or no – inferring the implicature is a way of establishing that
while what she said is not strictly speaking relevant, Relation is nevertheless satis-
ﬁed at the level of what is implied.
3.2 Obeying Maxims and Being Cooperative
A more promising response to our claim that the inference involved in (1) is rele-
vantly parallel to the inference involved in (2) is to object that the former inference
cannot be seen as proceeding via an appeal to the Cooperative Principle. Grice
took inferences of implicatures to centrally rely on the assumption that the speaker
is cooperating. For example, towards the end of “Logic and Conversation,” Grice
says,
[T]o calculate a conversational implicature is to calculate what has to be sup-
posed in order to preserve the supposition that the Cooperative Principle is
being observed [...]. (Grice, 1989, 39–40)
Similarly, in providing his “general paĴern for the working out of a conversational
implicature,” Grice explicitly includes an appeal to the Cooperative Principle.5 The
general paĴern is described as follows:
5Gricemakes essentially the same remark in “UĴerer’sMeaning and Intentions” (see Grice, 1989,
86).
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He has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing
the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; he could not be doing this
unless he thought that q; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows)
that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that q is required; he has
done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is at least
willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q. (Grice,
1989, 31)
The same choice of words is used immediately above, when Grice states that some-
one implicates something only if “he is to be presumed to be observing the conver-
sational maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle [...].” (Grice, 1989, 30)
So perhaps the suggestion thatGricean inferences involve assumptions of truth-
fulness should be understood as not pertaining to reasoning about whether the
speaker is obeying maxims, rather than to reasoning about whether the speaker is
being cooperative at all. We might try to restate the Gricean claim as in (III).
(III) H assumes that S is trying to satisfy the Cooperative Principle, in producing
an uĴerance u only ifH assumes that S is not disregarding the First Maxim
of Quality in producing u.
If the Gricean claim about truthfulness and cooperation is to be understood in this
way, one might suggest trying to distinguish between (1) and (2) by agreeing that
both are inferred via an assumption that the speaker is obeying Relation, while
insisting that only in the laĴer case does the hearer also assume that the speaker is
being cooperative.
In support of this line of argument, onemight point to the fact that, even though
Grice thought of themaxims as norms that implement cooperation in conversation,
he is careful to qualify his statement of this idea. Grice says that the maxims are
principles “the following of which will, in general, yield results in accordance with
the Cooperative Principle.” (1989, 26, emphasis added) Perhaps we should think
of (1) as a case where following the maxims does not yield compliance with the
Cooperative Principle.
There are two main problems with this strategy for diﬀerentiating between (1)
and (2). First, if it is agreed that the inference in (1) proceeds via the assumption
that the speaker is trying to satisfy Relation, the Gricean has arguably given up
the original view concerning the centrality of quality maxims. Conceding that the
inference in (1) proceeds by assuming the speaker is obeying Relation is in con-
ﬂict with Grice’s suggestion that “other maxims come into operation only on the
assumption that [the First Maxim of Quality] is satisﬁed.” (Grice, 1989, 27)
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Second, it is hard to see how to understand the suggestion that, in (1), Louise
assumes that Thelma is trying to satisfy Relation but does not assume that she is
trying to comply with the Cooperative Principle. This would amount to the claim
that while Louise assumes that Thelma is trying to be relevant, she is not assuming
that Thelma is trying to make her contribution such as is required, at the stage at
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which
she is engaged. It is at best unclear how to make sense of this idea.
Hence, despite the fact that, in (1), Thelma is being untruthful, it is not easy to
see this as a case inwhich compliancewith Relation does not yield compliancewith
the Cooperative Principle. Instead, it might be proposed that the reason Thelma
cannot be seen as being cooperative is that, since she is being untruthful, she is not
speaking in a way that counts as what Grice thinks of as making a contribution at
all. We have already seen evidence for this way of thinking in Grice’s statement,
from the “Retrospective Epilogue,” that the Supermaxim of Quality marks the dif-
ference between something being a (genuine) contribution or not (see Grice, 1989,
371).
However, it is question-begging to appeal to this idea at this point in the dialec-
tics. We have pointed to evidence against the claim that the relevant inferences are
made only under the assumption that the speaker is being truthful. The potential
response under consideration is that, while Louise assumes that Thelma is obey-
ing Relation, she does not assume that Thelma is obeying the Cooperative Princi-
ple, and hence the inference is suﬃciently diﬀerent from those involved in truthful
cases. But to motivate this proposal by the claim that making a contribution at
all requires being truthful – and hence that assuming that someone is making a
contribution requires assuming they are being truthful – is to beg the question. It
is no good to simply insist that making cooperative contributions requires being
truthful.
As a ﬁnal option at this point, one might suggest distinguishing between dif-
ferent senses of cooperation. One might think that Grice’s original notion of coop-
eration should be understood as applying to discourse that is ultimately aimed at
exchanging truths.6 On the other hand, since inferences that appear to have all the
trademarks of Gricean inferences are routinely drawn in spite of known untruth-
fulness, this might suggest looking for a way of understanding cooperativeness
such that being cooperative, in the relevant sense, does not require obeying quality
maxims.
A view of this kind is suggested by Richmond Thomason (1990). Agreeing
6See Grice (1989, 371) for some support for this interpretation.
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that “implicatures are possible in situations that can only be described as hostile
or uncooperative” (1990, 355), Thomason suggests that we should react by under-
standing the kind of cooperation involved in conversations as “a shared sense of
where the conversation has been and of where it is headed: the common plan of
the conversation.” (1990, 356)
One can see the kind of cooperation that, according to the Gricean program, is
necessary for generating implicatures – and for communicatingmore generally – as
cooperation toward the goal of sharing truths. If so, then one cannot regard some-
onewho violates qualitymaxims as being cooperative. Yet one can also understand
cooperation in a conversation as cooperation toward eﬃcient information-sharing,
broadly understood.7
Given this kind of distinction, contributions might be seen as “genuine,” in
the Gricean sense, only if the comply with the truth-oriented sense of cooperation.
Hence, Thelma’s uĴerance will be seen as not genuine, in this sense. But on the
other hand, the implicature that is inferred from it might be explained in terms of
cooperation in the broader, Thomasonian sense.
This line of thought, however, is not a threat to the argument I am pursuing. It
still amounts to accepting that implicatures may be inferred by way of a presump-
tion that the speaker is being cooperative (in one sense), even when the hearer can
see that the speaker is not being truthful in the sense of obeying qualitymaxims. To
be sure, the Gricean might reserve a narrow sense of cooperation and declare that
untruthful contributions are not cooperative, in this sense, and hence should be
seen as “spurious.” But this does not explain away implicatures that are inferred
from untruthful contributions. (I return later, in 4.1, to the issue of implicature-
generation without presumptions of cooperation.)
The Gricean is in need of a convincing way of motivating that, while the in-
ference in (2) involves an assumption of cooperation, the inference in (1) does not.
However, as I argue below, there are reasons for thinking that diﬀerentiating be-
tween the cases in this way will be arbitrary.
3.3 Situated Inference
How might one argue that Louise’s inference in (1) does not proceed via the as-
sumption that Thelma wants to cooperate? A promising suggestion is that, rather
than seeing the inference in (1) as a Gricean inference, based on assumptions con-
cerning the speaker’s intentions, or state of mind more generally, the inference can
7See also Lepore and Stone (2015, ch. 14) for recent, relevant discussion.
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be explained simply as a logical or probabilistic inference relying on background
assumptions. The claim would be that, in (1), Louise infers that Thelma is OK to
drive – or perhaps that Thelma is probably OK to drive – solely on the basis of the
information provided bywhat is said, i.e., that she has not been drinking, and back-
ground assumptions such as that Thelma knows how to drive, the road conditions
are not unusual, etc.
To be sure, in (1), Louise does not come to believe that Thelma is OK to drive –
nor that she is probablyOK to drive – on the basis of her inference. But granting this
arguably does not rule out seeing Louise as inferring from what Thelma said that
she is probably OK to drive. We might think of the case along the following lines.
Louise notes that Thelma said that she has not been drinking. She has available
the information that if Thelma has not been drinking, she is probably OK to drive.
So Louise notes that what Thelma said implies that she is probably OK to drive.
Indeed, it seems right to say that what Louise takes from Thelma’s uĴerance in
(1), among other things, is the observation that what she said implies that she is
probably OK to drive. Hence, as long as this is all wemean by the claim that Louise
infers that Thelma is probably OK to drive from what Thelma said, we are not
precluded from seeing Louise as making this kind of inference.8
The main problem for the Gricean is that, if she endorses this approach to (1), it
is hard to see how to motivate not applying it to cases like (2), as well. If one thinks
that, in (1), Louise can infer that Thelma is probably OK to drive directly from
what she says, and background assumptions, without recourse to an assumption
concerning Thelma’s cooperativeness, what is the argument for not accounting for
(2) in the sameway? As before, there seems to be noway of diﬀerentiating between
the cases without begging the question.
In other words, this route appears to end up endorsing the view that, at least
for cases the Gricean wants to explain as implicatures generated by Relation, most
of these can be explained as ordinary inferences of the kind described above. Chris
Gauker (2001) defends a position of this kind. According to Gauker, “the concept
of conversational implicature is not a useful concept in the theory of language.”
(Gauker, 2001, 170) Instead, Gauker argues that cases the Gricean explains in terms
of implicature are beĴer explained as cases of what he calls situated inference. That
is, the inferences that the Gricean thinks are inferences of implicatures are, for
8There is another sense of “A infers q from p,” i.e., the sense in which this involves deducing q
from p by consciously going through a process of valid reasoning. It is less plausible to think of
Louise inferring that Thelma is probably OK to drive from what she says in this sense. But even if
this is the preferred way of thinking of her reasoning, this clearly does not commit one to the claim
that she comes to believe that Thelma is OK to drive.
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Gauker, simply inferences that are made on the basis of what is said, awareness
of relevant contextual facts, and background assumptions.
Consider, for example, how Gauker explains Grice’s (1989, 32) familiar case of
the motorist whose car is out of gas. The dialogue is as in (3).
(3) A: I am out of gasoline.
B: There is a gas station around the corner.
Gauker writes,
To explain the success of communication in this case, we have to explain how
A is able to conclude fromwhat B explicitly says that he can get gas at the gas
station around the corner. One explanation for A’s drawing this conclusion
might be Grice’s own explanation of this, namely, that A recognizes that this
is what B must be supposing if B is conforming to the Cooperative Principle.
An alternative explanation is that A reasons from the truth of what B says
and the character of the external situation to the conclusion that if there is
a gas station around the corner then probably it is open and has gas to sell.
Thoughts about what the speaker must have been thinking need not play any
role whatsoever, and the speaker need not have intended the hearer to have
any such thoughts. In my view, this is in fact the beĴer explanation. (Gauker,
2001, 174)
Applied to the case of (1), the claim would be that Louise infers that Thelma is
probably OK to drive on the basis of her recognition that Thelma said that she has
not been drinkingwithout proceeding byway of an assumption that Thelmawants
to cooperate.9 And moreover, the same explanation would be given for run of the
mill cases like (2).
It is not being denied that Thelma says what she does precisely with the inten-
tion that Louise should make the inference she does make. A view like Gauker’s
merely claims that Louise does not need the assumption that this is what Thelma
intends as a premise for her inference. As Gauker says about the gas station exam-
ple:
B might indeed intend that A will conclude that the gas station is open and
has gas to sell (or maybe not), and in order for A to reach this conclusion A
9We assume that Gauker’s idea of reasoning “from the truth of” what is said can be construed
along the lines suggested earlier, i.e., so as not necessarily to involve coming to believe the conclu-
sion. In particular, we assume that an explanation alongGauker’s lines can be given for cases where
the hearer knows that what the speaker says is false. We can think of the hearer, in such cases, as
reasoning from the supposition that what the speaker said is true.
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will have to pay aĴention to various features of the situation beyond what B
explicitly said; but there is no special reason for A to pay aĴention to what
B might have had in mind in speaking, and B need not intend A to do so.
(Gauker, 2001, 175)
I take it that the kind of inference Gauker describes might occur in many cases that,
according to the Gricean, involve implicatures. In particular, we should grant that,
in (1) and (2), Louisemight infer fromThelma’s uĴerance that she is probablyOK to
drive without proceeding by way of a premise concerning Thelma’s state of mind.
Yet, even if Gauker is right about the inferences targeted by his discussion, it
can be argued that there are inferences, which hearers routinely make, and which
do rely on assumptions of cooperation. In both (1) and (2), Louise does not only
infer that Thelma is probably OK to drive, and nor is that all that Thelma intended
her to infer. In both cases Louise also infers that Thelmawanted to convey that she is
OK to drive. The inference she makes is not simply one about the facts concerning
whether Thelma is (probably) OK to drive. Louise also makes an inference about
Thelma’s goals in making her uĴerance. Similarly, in the motorist example of (3),
that he can get gas at the gas station around the corner is not all that A infers from
B’s uĴerance. A will also infer that B wanted to convey that he can get gas at the
gas station around the corner.
Generalizing, in many cases, the hearer not only makes an inference fromwhat
is said, but also infers something about what the speaker wanted to convey by
sayingwhat she did. Andmoreover, while Gaukermight be right about the former
type of inference, it is hard to see how to account for the laĴer kind of inference
without seeing it as proceeding by way of assumptions about the speaker’s eﬀorts
to cooperate.
In both (1) and (2), the most natural way of explaining how Louise infers from
Thelma’s uĴerance that Thelmawants to convey that she is OK to drive is arguably
to see it as an inference that proceeds by way of the assumption that Thelma wants
to cooperate. That is, the assumption that Thelma wants to provide an answer to
the question, “Are you OK to drive?” And similarly, to explain howA infers, in (3),
that B wants to convey that A can get gas at the gas station around the corner, one
arguably needs to see the inference as proceeding via the assumption that B wants
to cooperate. That is, roughly, that B wants to make a contribution that is helpful
in the situation where A has just informed B of being out of gas.
Against Gauker’s wholesale rejection of the category of implicatures, then, the
Gricean can claim that at least some inferences based on observation of what is said
that hearers routinely make are best explained as proceeding by way of assump-
15
tions concerning the hearer’s aĴempt to cooperate.
However, of course, this hardly vindicates the further Gricean claim that coop-
eration involves truthfulness. In (1) Louise’s inference that Thelmawants to convey
that she is OK to drive ismade despite Louise’s recognition that Thelma is violating
both the First Maxim of Quality and the Supermaxim of Quality. So if we are right
that this inference is explained in terms of an assumption of cooperation, we still
have reason to conclude that assuming that one’s interlocutor is cooperating does
not require assuming that she is being truthful.
3.4 Bald-Faced Implicature
At this point the Gricean might want to shift gears and focus more on what hearers
must be assuming about what speakers want them to assume, rather than focusing
more directly on what hearers assume about the extent to which speakers in fact
comply with norms of truthfulness. Perhaps the Gricean should grant that, in (1),
Louise does not assume that Thelma is being truthful, but point out that Louise
nevertheless knows that Thelma intended her to believe that she is being truthful.
In other words, it might be observed that, even if the inference in (1) does not pro-
ceed via the assumption that Thelma is in fact being truthful, it does proceed via
an assumption that Thelma intended Louise to assume that she is being truthful.
Along these lines, the Gricean might want to recast her view as (IV).
(IV) H assumes thatS is trying to satisfy othermaxims in producing an uĴerance
u only ifH assumes thatS intended thatH assume thatS is not disregarding
the First Maxim of Quality in producing u.
Arguably, if something like (IV) is right, this would be a way of vindicating the
original idea that a speaker’s assumption that a hearer is obeying maxims relies on
her assuming that the speaker is being truthful, at least in the sense that it relies on
an assumption that the speaker wanted to be perceived as being truthful.
(IV) is satisﬁed in normal cases of implicature, in which the hearer has reason
to believe (or has no reason not to believe) that the speaker is saying something
she believes to be true in order to implicate something she also believes to be true,
as in (2) and (3). Moreover, (IV) still allows the Gricean to pursue the response
to the position championed by Gauker we described above. That is, it might be
granted that inferring that Thelma is probably OK to drive itself does not rely on
assumptions about Thelma’s intentions, but still, inferring that Thelma wanted to
convey that she is probably OK to drive does rely on such assumptions. Indeed, it
is reasonable to think that it does.
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The problem with this is that we can imagine cases in which not even (IV) is
satisﬁed. In (1) Thelma is trying to be covertly untruthful, but is found out by
Louise. But there are cases in which the speaker is not even trying to be covertly
untruthful, but in which the relevant kind of inference is still made by the hearer.
These are cases in which an implicature is derived from so-called bald-faced lies,
that is, open or undisguised lies.10 As we might say, these are cases of bald-faced
implicature.
Suppose, for example, that it is common knowledge between Thelma and Louise
that Thelma has been drinking. That is, Thelma knows that Louise knows that
Thelma knows that Louise knows, etc., that Thelma has been drinking. If our dia-
logue takes place in this seĴing, Louise will still infer that Thelma wanted to con-
vey that she is probably OK to drive. Of course, as before, she will not believe that
Thelma is probably OK to drive. But she will still infer that Thelma wanted to con-
vey that she is, and indeed, Louise will recognize (correctly) that Thelma wanted
her to recognize that she wanted her to do so.
Again, it is hard to see how to explain this inference except as based on an
assumption about Thelma’s wants to cooperate, and in particular, that shewants to
satisfy Relation. And so, (IV) still does not manage to spell out a way of upholding
the Gricean idea that a hearer is assumed to be cooperative, in the sense of obeying
maxims, only to the extent that she is assumed to be truthful.
4 Implicature and Rationality
4.1 Implicature without Truthfulness
I have argued that at least some inferences that are drawn on the basis of assump-
tions of cooperation aremade independently of assumptions of truthfulness. Should
we think of these cases as inferences of conversational implicatures? I think we
should. As is often emphasized, Grice stresses repeatedly that an implicature is an
inference that is needed for preserving the presumption that the speaker is observ-
ing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle. For example, in the passage
we quoted earlier, Grice says,
10For discussion, see Carson (2006), Sorensen (2007), Fallis (2009), Stokke (2013). Some writers,
e.g., Lackey (2013), object that, in the relevant examples, the speaker is nevertheless trying to hide
information from the hearer. Even if such critics are right, this is irrelevant to my argument, since,
in the relevant cases, the hearer is still not assuming that the speaker intended the hearer to assume
that the speaker is not violating the First Maxim of Quality.
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[T]o calculate a conversational implicature is to calculate what has to be sup-
posed in order to preserve the supposition that the Cooperative Principle is
being observed [...]. (Grice, 1989, 39–40, emphasis added)
Similarly, considerGrice’s statement of three necessary conditions on implicature:11
Amanwho, by (in, when) saying (ormaking as if to say) that p has implicated
that q, may be said to have conversationally implicated that q, provided that
(1) he is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at
least the Cooperative Principle; (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or
thinks that, q is required in order tomake his saying ormaking as if to say p (or
doing so in those terms) consistentwith this presumption; and (3) the speaker
thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it
is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that
the supposition mentioned in (2) is required. (Grice, 1989, 30–31, emphasis
added)
Louise’s inference that Thelma wants to convey that she is OK to drive, in (1),
ﬁts this paĴern. As suggested earlier (see section 3.1), in (1), the assumption that
Thelmawants to cooperate amounts to the assumption that she wants to convey an
answer to the question, “Are you OK to drive?” Since there are only two answers
to this polar question, assuming that Thelma wants to convey an answer means
assuming that she wants to convey either a yes or a no. If Louise were to infer that
Thelma wanted to convey that she is not OK to drive, this would make a mystery
of why Thelma said that she has not been drinking. So in order to reconcile that
Thelma said what she did with the assumption that she wants to convey an answer
to the question, “Are you OK to drive?” Louise must infer that Thelma wanted to
convey that she is OK to drive.
So Louise’s inference that Thelma wanted to convey that she is OK to drive sat-
isﬁes Grice’s characterizations of conversational implicatures. Moreover, as sug-
gested earlier (see section 2.3), that Thelma wanted to convey that she is OK to
drive is something Thelma intended Louise to infer from her uĴerance.
As noted earlier, Saul (2002) distinguishes between uĴerer-implicatures and
audience-implicatures, the former being, roughly, implicatures the speaker intended
the audience to infer, and the laĴer being, roughly, implicatures the audience in fact
infers from what the speaker says. The kind of examples I have appealed to – as
represented by (1) – are cases where these coincide. Hence, even if one is sympa-
thetic to this kind of distinction, one should agree that cases like (1) are cases of
implicature in both senses.
11See also (Grice, 1989, 370).
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By contrast, Stephen Neale (1992) suggests that something is an implicature
only if it is intended, and he argues that this condition is grounded in Grice’s view
of implicatures as an aspect of speaker meaning:
A necessary condition on conversational implicatures [...] is that they are in-
tended. This follows [...] at least from the fact that (a) what U implicates is
part of what U means, and (b) what U means is determined by U ’s commu-
nicative intentions. (Neale, 1992, 528)
To repeat, in (1), Thelma intends that Louise infer that she is OK to drive. And fur-
thermore, the laĴer content is something that Thelma meant, in the Gricean sense.
For Grice, to say that a speaker S meant that p, roughly, is to say that S intended
that the hearerH come to believe that p partly as a result of recognizing this inten-
tion.12 In (1) Thelma wants Louise to believe both that she has not been drinking
and that she is OK to drive. Both these things are part of what Thelma means, on
this occasion.
Finally, some writers defend the view that, contrary to Grice’s own account,
implicatures do not rely on cooperation. For example, Wayne Davis (1998) argues
that “Conversational implicatures may exist when there is no presumption on any-
one’s part that the speaker is observing the Cooperative Principle.” (1998, 115) Part
of Davis’s case for this conclusion is based on cases similar to our case of (1). Here
is one of his examples (Davis, 1998, 116):
(4) Karen: Were you with Jennifer last night?
George: I was out drinking with the guys.
Davis claims that, “George implicated that he was not with Jennifer last night. He
may have implicated this even if Karen knows he is lying, having seen George and
Jennifer together.” (Davis, 1998, 116)
For Davis, a speaker’s conversationally implicating something is chieﬂy a mat-
ter of the speaker having certain intentions.13 He takes cases like (4) to demonstrate
that speakers may have such intentions even when they are not presumed to be co-
operating. Davis writes,
What S implicates cannot be due even in part towhat others presume or know
about S. To implicate something is to mean or imply it in a certain way. And
asGrice [...] correctly observed, tomean or imply something is to have certain
intentions. But S’s intentions do not depend on what anyone else presumes.
(Davis, 1998, 122)
12See Neale (1992, 515).
13See Saul (2002, 240-241) for criticism of this view.
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Accordingly, Davis thinks that, in (4), George may have intended to convey that he
was not with Jennifer last night, even if Karen does not take him to be cooperating.
This I take to be hard to deny. But, by contrast, what I have been arguing for is a
point concerning the way hearers infer, or work out, implicatures. I take the idea
that such inferences rely on assumptions of cooperation, and perhaps on assump-
tions of truthfulness, to be a more interesting thesis than the one Davis is targeting.
It is worth stressing, however, that my arguments do not conﬂict with Davis’s case
for the conclusion that speakers may intend implicatures even when they are not
presumed to be cooperating.
I conclude that the case of (1) has the characteristics of a case of conversational
implicature, independently of how one thinks of the issues concerning the diﬀer-
ence betweenuĴerer-implicature and audience-implicature, or the issue ofwhether
being intended by the speaker is a necessary condition on implicature. In these
respects, (1) is parallel to (2). Hence, we should conclude that conversational im-
plicature – and more broadly, the kind of communication that Grice identiﬁed as
relying on cooperation – does not rely on a presumption of truthfulness.14
4.2 Untruthfulness and the Rational Basis of Cooperation
According towhat I have been arguing, the conclusion that Thelmawants to convey
that she is OK to drive is arrived at via the assumption that Thelmawants to satisfy
theMaxim of Relation, or at least the Cooperative Principle. We have seen that this
assumption may be in place even when the hearer knows that the speaker is not
observing quality maxims, i.e., even when the hearer knows the speaker is being
untruthful.
However, it might be asked, why should one assume that one’s interlocutor is
being cooperative when one can see that they are being untruthful? Familiarly,
Grice was adamant that the practice of following the Cooperative Principle and
the maxims has a rational basis. As he says,
I would like to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice
not merely as something that all or most do in fact follow but as something
14This conclusion is compatiblewith other views according towhich truthfulness is a prerequisite
for communicative practices. For example, Lewis (1969), (1975) held that a language L is used by a
population P if and only if there is a convention of truthfulness and trust in L among the members
of P . The fact that Gricean inferences may be drawn in the absence of assumptions of truthfulness
is compatible with the view that conventions of truthfulness and trust are necessary for our practice
of using a particular language to communicate with each other.
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that it is reasonable for us to follow, that we should not abandon. (Grice, 1989,
29)
Given this, one way of suggesting an explanation of the basis for Louise’s assump-
tion that Thelma wants to cooperate in (1) is to say that she does so simply because
she is following a practice that is already established, and which has a rational un-
derpinning. But it might be felt that it would be preferable if it could be established
that, even in the case of (1), the assumption that Thelma wants to cooperate can be
seen as rational, and not just because it constitutes following a practice that is oth-
erwise rational.
Put diﬀerently, can it be rational to assume that someone one knows is being
untruthful is observing Gricean maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle? A
full response to this question is far beyond the scope of this paper. But I want to end
by suggesting at least some reason for thinking that it can be given an aﬃrmative
answer.
It is not unreasonable to think that we need to be able to work out what people
want to convey to us, even when we know they are being untruthful. Doing so
is helpful, for example, for evaluating the overall trustworthiness of the speaker,
which in turn is useful for evaluating what they might tell us in the future, or in-
deed evaluating what they have told us in the past. More generally, discovering
what someone will aĴempt to make us believe – even when we already know the
truth of the maĴer – may be useful for learning about their character, or for learn-
ing about their intentions in the more immediate situation. If this is right, it at least
goes some way toward explaining why it is reasonable to take speakers as cooper-
ating, in the sense of obeying maxims and trying to make pertinent contributions
to conversations, even if one knows they are being untruthful.
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